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animacy	 and	 relationships	 between	 conspecifics	 and	 ‘others’.	 	 Our	 analysis	
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Introduction	
	
Humans	are	egocentric,	species-centric	creatures.	Language,	as	a	uniquely	
human	phenomenon,	reflects	this	in	many	ways,	but	it	is	brought	out	especially	
clearly	in	the	domain	of	linguistic	animacy.	Linguistic	reflections	of	animacy	are	
known	not	to	directly	represent	biological	animacy,	drawing	instead	on	an	
anthropocentric	worldview,	and	leading	to	a	skewed	reflection	of	animacy	in	
both	grammatical	structure	and	language	use	(Dahl	2008;	Yamamoto	1999).			
	 In	children’s	stories	we	often	find	the	constraints	of	real-world	animacy	
flouted,	with	tales	told	from	the	viewpoint	of	anthropomorphised	animals	and	
others	lower	on	the	animacy	hierarchy	than	humans.	Many	of	the	reasons	for	
this	practice	are	related	to	children’s	cognitive	development.	Animals	are	
fascinating	for	children	due	to	their	cuddliness	and	otherness,	but	their	use	in	
children’s	narratives	is	also	likely	to	be	related	to	the	attention,	interest,	and	
memory	of	children,	including	factors	such	as	salience	and	surprisal.		
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Importantly,	stories	told	to	a	young	audience	can	also	draw	narrative	
power	from	subverting	the	often	intermediary	position	children	find	themselves	
in.	Hierarchies	of	social	status	–	and	sometimes	linguistic	animacy	scales	–
distinguish	children	and	adults.	These	conventions	differ	across	cultures	and	
over	time.	The	pronoun	(boldface)	in	the	quote	in	(1),	written	nearly	a	century	
ago	by	A.A.	Milne	(the	creator	of	Winnie	the	Pooh,	one	of	the	most	beloved	
talking	animals	in	children’s	literature),	demonstrates	that	at	that	time,	children	
were	bequeathed	lower	animacy	status	than	today.		
	
(1)		 ...the	spectacle	in	real	life	of	a	child	at	three	at	its	prayers	is	one	over	
which	thousands	have	been	sentimental.	[...]	prayer	means	nothing	to	a	
child	of	three,	whose	thoughts	are	engaged	with	other,	more	exciting	
matters...	(A.A.	Milne,	cited	in	C.	Milne	1974/2016:	23-24)	
	
The	use	of	the	nongendered	inanimate	pronoun	‘it’	to	refer	to	a	child	is	frowned	
on	in	today’s	anglophone	cultures.	This	example	is	striking	in	that	the	inanimate	
pronoun	is	used	even	while	discussing	children’s	mental	lives	–	prayer	and	other	
preoccupations	–	a	topic	which	could	only	belong	to	animate	creatures.	
In	contemporary	children’s	entertainment,	talking,	human-like	animals	
are	commonplace,	and	they	have	been	joined	not	only	by	humanoids	like	R2D2	
but	also	animate	fruit,	furniture,	trains,	and	a	bilingual	backpack	(in	Dora	the	
Explorer).	The	three	Toy	Story	films	(1995,	1999,	2010)	capitalize	on	this	trend,	
building	on	the	childhood	fantasy	of	dolls	and	toys	living	a	secret	life	when	
humans	cannot	hear	or	see	them.i		
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In	this	paper,	we	scrutinize	the	first	of	these	films,	Toy	Story	(Pixar,	1996).	
We	have	chosen	to	analyse	the	referring	expressions	used	in	this	film	because	it	
naturally	lends	itself	as	a	case	study	for	animacy.	Various	points	on	a	scale	of	
animacy	are	represented	by	the	characters	brought	to	life	in	the	film.	Crucially,	
all	of	the	characters	are	toys,	and	so	not	alive	in	the	ordinary	sense,	but	in	the	
fictional	world	of	child’s	play,	they	mimic	aspects	of	the	real	world,	from	human-
like	dolls	to	telephones.	When	they	all	come	to	life	in	the	film,	we	may	ask	how	
the	linguistic	animacy	scale,	reflecting	ordinary	conceptualisations	of	animacy	
differences,	affects	both	their	social	relations	and	linguistic	interactions.		
The	film	goes	beyond	simple	anthropocentrism.	Complex	relations	are	
evoked	between	human,	semi-human	and	non-human	toys.	While	English	
referring	expressions	typically	make	a	relatively	simple	distinction	between	
human	and	inanimate,	the	characters	in	the	film	might	require	further	
distinctions	on	the	inanimate,	bottom	end	of	the	hierarchy.	Yet,	inanimate	dolls	
and	toys	are	animated	in	the	film,	which	may	instead	simply	translate	into	a	
broader	class	of	animates,	rather	than	further	refinement	among	inanimates.	
Animacy	informs	the	language	and	content	of	the	film,	and	is	explored	as	a	
subtheme	involving	agency	and	empathy.	
In	this	study,	we	analyse	the	characters	in	Toy	Story	and	their	interactions,	
examining	both	visual	and	linguistic	cues	to	their	animacy	and	claims	to	
empathy.	We	look	at	the	ways	language	supports	and	extends	the	animacy	
distinctions	represented	in	the	film.	We	then	analyse	two	key	scenes	in	which	
referring	expressions	are	used	to	mediate	visually	accessible	cues	to	animacy,	
and	are	manipulated	to	guide	viewers’	empathies	and	allegiances	at	crucial	
junctures	in	the	film’s	narrative.	
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Animacy	in	fiction	
	
In	examining	language	used	in	fiction	to	reflect	or	construct	animacy,	we	must	be	
aware	of	the	ways	in	which	fiction	can	stretch	linguistic	resources	in	the	same	
way	a	work	of	fiction	can	reimagine	animacy	and	sentience.	It	may	be	that	any	
entity	can	be	anthropomorphized	in	a	work	of	fiction	or	entertainment,	but	we	
expect	to	see	concomitant	differences	in	the	language	used.	As	Trompenaars	et	
al.	(in	review)	demonstrate,	a	narrative	imagining	the	internal	monologue	of	a	
lifeless	painting	does	not	show	the	same	patterns	of	language	use	as	a	narrative	
with	humans	as	narrators.	
	 Searle	(1969)	proposes	a	contrast	between	real	and	fictional	worlds,	and	
that	the	act	of	referring	in	each	world	obtains	different	truth	values:	“The	axiom	
of	existence	holds	across	the	board:	in	real	world	talk	one	can	refer	only	to	what	
exists;	in	fictional	talk	one	can	refer	to	what	exists	in	fiction…”	(1969:	79).	Yet,	
what	is	‘real’	to	one	speaker	(ghosts,	conspiracies)	may	not	be	real	to	another.	
Even	if	we	speak	of	a	world	reimagined	with	talking	cars	and	slinkies,	the	ways	
in	which	we	(and	they)	talk	about	referents	in	the	fictional	world	puts	to	the	test	
our	conceptions	of	the	relation	between	words,	referents	and	properties	such	as	
agency,	sentience	and	empathy.	Extending	a	similar	argument	by	Lyons	(1977),		
Yamamoto	notes	that	models	of	animacy	should	be	able	to	capture	various	‘kinds	
of	existence’	and	realities	(1999:	13).	In	this	light,	the	language	employed	in	
children’s	fiction	may	provide	insight	into	linguistic	animacy	relations	in	general.	
6	
	
A	brief	overview	of	linguistic	animacy	is	presented	in	the	Background	section,	
including	discussion	of	reference	and	nonlinguistic	cues	to	animacy.	We	then	
analyse	the	characters	appearing	in	Toy	Story,	expressions	used	to	refer	to	them,	
and	non-linguistic	cues	to	their	animacy.	Following	that,	we	discuss	referential	
language	in	key	scenes	of	narrative	shift.	Implications	and	conclusions	are	
discussed	in	the	final	section.		
	
Background	
	
Animacy	and	reference	
	
The	linear	scales	posited	to	account	for	linguistic	animacy	–	and	the	
morphosyntactic	phenomena	conditioned	by	it	–	include	a	fair	amount	of	
diversity,	but	can	be	schematised	as	in	(2):	
	
(2)	Basic	animacy	hierarchy:		
	
Human	>	Animal	>	Inanimate	
	
In	practice,	this	scale	interacts	with	scales	of	person	(Siewierska	1993),	
individuation	(Dahl	&	Fraurud	1993;	Yamamoto	1999)	and	empathy	(DeLancey	
1981),	in	addition	to	referential	forms.	Language-specific	variations	on	the	scales	
may	also	be	affected	by	gender,	definiteness,	politeness,	and	a	host	of	other	
categories	(see,	e.g.	Dahl	2008,	Lockwood	&	McCaulay	2012).	
	 The	high	end	of	the	animacy	scale	displays	more	differentiation	in	human	
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languages	than	the	low	end.		This	imbalance	derives	from	both	anthropocentrism	
and	empathy:		
	
Speakers,	being	animate	and	human,	are	more	likely	to	‘empathize	
with’	(i.e.	take	the	viewpoint	of)	human	beings	than	animals,	and	of	
animals	than	inanimates	[...]	the	entire	hierarchy	can	be	interpreted	
in	terms	of	relative	eligibility	for	viewpoint	placement	(DeLancey	
1981:	645).			
	
As	pointed	out	by	Dahl	(2008),	the	animacy	scale	may	have	its	evolutionary	
origins	in	the	adaptive	ability	to	identify	and	distinguish	conspecifics	from	others	
(see	also	Leopold	&	Rhodes	2010).	High	animacy	is	therefore	linked	with	
familiarity	and	kinship,	and	by	extension,	empathy.	
Work	in	the	frameworks	of	givenness,	salience,	and	accessibility	show	
that	speakers’	choices	of	referential	expressions	are	affected	by	how	accessible	
the	referent	is,	in	the	context	of	the	discourse	and	the	pragmatic	context	(e.g.	
Gundel,	Hedberg,	&	Zacharski	1993,	Ariel	1990,	1991).	Prominence	hierarchies	
may	draw	on	both	animacy	and	referential	hierarchies,	distinguishing,	for	
instance,	pronominal	expressions	referring	to	speech	act	participants	(first	and	
second	person)	and	other	humans,	often	differentiated	by	gender.	In	(3),	we	
show	how	both	a	slightly	elaborated	animacy	scale	and	a	schematic	scale	of	
referential	accessibility	involve	gradation,	directionality	and	similar	distinctions,	
although	there	is	no	direct	mapping	between	them;	the	pronoun-NP	contrast,	in	
fact,	is	orthogonal	to	the	animacy	scale	itself	(Comrie	1989:	195).	
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(3)		
1st	&	2nd	person	>	3rd	person	human	>	animal	>	inanimate	>	abstract	
ANIMACY	
	
	
1st	&	2nd	>	3rd	person	pronoun	>	proper	names	>	definite	nouns	>	indef.	nouns		
ACCESSIBILITY		
	
Yamamoto	questions	and	restructures	the	linear	animacy	scale,	replacing	it	with	
a	radial	picture	of	the	gradience	involved	(1999:	22;	adapted	here	in	Figure	1).	
This	picture	represents	the	fundamentally	anthropomorphic	viewpoint	of	
language,	with	several	categories	radiating	from	a	central	(individual)	‘human	
being’	node.	These	include	distinct	scales	for	animals	(with	pets	conceptually	
closer	to	humans	than	wild	animals);	collectives;	supernatural	beings;	and	
human-like	machines	closer	to	the	centre	than	other	machines	and	inanimate	
objects.	More	peripheral	categories	have	weaker	ascribed	animacy,	regardless	of	
their	biological	status.	
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Figure	1:	Radial	animacy	(adapted	from	Yamamoto	1999:	22)	
	
	
Non-linguistic	cues	to	animacy		
	
Non-linguistic	cues	to	animacy	remain	relevant	in	the	fictional	world,	especially	
in	terms	of	credibility	of	the	narrative,	in	order	to	harness	viewers’	suspension	of	
disbelief	and	empathy.	We	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	most	prominent	cues	
to	animacy:	these	involve	dynamic	cues,	other	visual	cues	and	indirect	cues.		
Hurford	characterizes	animacy	as	“the	potential	for	biological	motion”	
(2007:	41-45).	Dynamic	cues	are	perceptually	salient	and	robust,	and	are	
therefore	readily	accessible	for	assessing	animacy.	The	capability	of	self-
propelled	motion	includes	both	agency	and	the	dynamics	of	motion.	Dynamic	
information	has	“the	capacity	to	signal	quite	abstract	conceptual	information,	
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such	as	agency,	intentionality,	or	goal-directedness”	(Gelman	&	Opfer	2010:	
155).	Very	young	children	have	been	shown	to	attribute	animacy	to	an	entity	
moving	in	the	direction	of	a	goal	(e.g.	Biro,	Csibra	&	Gergely	2007).		
Other	visual	cues	are	also	used	to	assess	(or	convey)	animacy.	The	face,	
and	particularly	the	eyes,	are	known	to	be	the	most	prominent	physical	cues	to	
animacy	(see	Gelman	&	Opfer	2010,	and	Johnson	&	Morton	1991	for	a	review);	
today’s	producers	of	children’s	fiction	and	entertainment	anthropomorphize	
virtually	anything	using	cartoon	‘googly	eyes’.	Eye	movement	and	gaze	are	
revealing	and	important	cues,	but	other	visual	cues	can	be	enlisted	as	well,	such	
as	texture	and	the	contour	of	a	shape	(for	instance,	fur	vs	smooth	lines;	Tsutsumi	
et	al.	2012	discuss	the	importance	of	eyes	and	fluffiness	as	cues	to	animacy	for	
infant	monkeys).	Natural	material	is	associated	with	higher	animacy	than	
manufactured	materials	like	plastic	or	metal	(Cherry	1992).		
Individuation	is	another	visually	salient	cue	to	animacy,	and	it	has	clear	
reflexes	in	linguistic	referential	systems	that	may	encode	related	features	
including	number,	collectivity,	and	specificity.	Yamamoto	(1999)	shows	that	
while	the	relationship	between	referential	individuation	and	animacy	may	vary	
cross-linguistically,	in	English	individual	referents	are	construed	as	having	a	
higher	value	for	animacy	than	collective	entities.					
Indirect	cues	to	animacy	give	rise	to	the	attribution	of	sentience	to	an	
entity,	and	are	closely	connected	to	empathy.	According	to	Delancey	(1991),	
empathy	is	the	driving	force	behind	animacy	effects	in	language:	grammatical	
systems	differentiate	more	often	between	discourse	participants	and	others	than	
between	animate	and	inanimate	entities.	Interpreting	an	entity’s	behavior	as	
intentional	is	equivalent	to	attributing	sentience	to	it	(cf	Siewierska	1991,	1993).	
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Speaking	and	emoting	are	often	taken	to	be	very	good	behavioral	indicators	of	
animacy.	Other	inner,	mental	properties	include	awareness	(Klaiman	1991)	and	
cleverness	(Yamamoto	1999);	each	of	these	is	relevant	to	animacy	in	that	they	
imply	inferred	or	ascribed	sentience.	The	property	of	cleverness	is	complex,	with	
many	borderline	cases	including	supernatural	beings,	computers,	cars,	as	well	as	
collective	entitites	such	as	human-based	organisations	and	countries.	
Makers	of	children’s	animated	films	employ	these	non-linguistic	cues	to	
recreate	a	hierarchy	of	animacy	in	a	fictional	world.	However,	referential	
language	can	be	employed	to	scaffold	viewers’	understanding	of	
anthropomorphized	toys,	and	to	shape,	refine,	and	manipulate	empathy.	In	the	
next	section,	we	discuss	the	above	properties	as	applied	to	the	characters	in	Toy	
Story	as	bundles	of	animacy	features,	and	in	relation	to	the	referring	expressions	
used.		
	
	
Animacy	and	referring	expressions	in	Toy	Story	
	
In	this	section,	we	discuss	the	characters	featured	in	Toy	Story,	and	show	how	
the	referential	expressions	used	to	refer	to	them	guide	viewers’	understanding	of	
ascribed	animacy	and	elicit	empathy.	The	Toy	Story	films	(3	to	date)	are	a	series	
produced	by	Pixar	animation	studios.	The	first	film	and	the	focus	of	this	paper,	
Toy	Story,	was	released	in	1996	to	critical	acclaim.		The	film	sets	out	a	fictional	
world	containing	a	rich	cast	of	characters	who	represent	various	points	on	the	
animacy	scale,	from	the	fully	anthropomorphized	central	characters	Woody	and	
Buzz	to	‘inanimate’	yet	clearly	sentient	toys	like	an	Eight	Ball	that	communicates	
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by	sending	visual	messages.	The	conceit	of	the	film	is	that	the	toys	spring	to	life	
when	humans	are	out	of	the	room;	drawing	on	the	metaphor	of	a	small	company	
with	an	internal	corporate	hierarchy,	the	toys	see	their	collective	role	as	making	
their	boy	owner	happy:	“What	matters	is	that	we’re	here	for	Andy	when	he	
needs	us.	That’s	what	we’re	MADE	FOR”	(Toy	Storyii,	13).	
The	cast	of	toy	characters	is	not	simply	anthropomorphised,	but	features	
complex	interactions	between	human-like,	animal-like	and	inanimate	toys	and	to	
a	lesser	extent,	with	their	human	owners.	Animacy	itself,	along	with	associated	
notions	of	empathy,	agency,	and	what	it	means	to	be	alive	and/or	human,	are	
explored	as	part	of	the	narrative	content.	Throughout	the	film,	referring	
expressions	are	used	to	mediate	accessible	cues	to	animacy,	and	to	guide	
viewers’	empathies	and	allegiances.		
	
Method	
	
For	our	analysis,	we	used	both	a	pdf	version	of	the	screenplay	of	the	film	
(Whedon	et	al.	1995)	and	the	film	itself.	We	identified	each	character	referred	to	
in	the	film’s	dialogue	with	referring	expressions	in	the	third	person.	We	excluded	
first	person	reference,	reference	via	gestural	deixis,	and	most	second	person	
reference,	but	included	tokens	of	second	person	when	embedded	inside	a	NP.	
This	was	done	by	reading	through	the	screenplay	and	making	manual	notes,	and	
then	checking	notes	while	viewing	the	film.	The	list	comprised	29	characters	in	
total.	We	collated	the	referring	expressions	used	for	each	character,	classifying	
them	into	seven	main	types	of	referential	expression.	These	mostly	reflect	
similar	forms	of	reference	as	those	used	in	scales	in	the	literature	(see	Ariel	
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1991,	Foley	&	Van	Valin	1984)	and	the	hierarchies	discussed	in	(3)	in	the	
previous	section.	Nevertheless,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	pronominal	
reference	is	used	for	highly	accessible	referents,	but	carries	salient	animacy	
information:	the	choice	of	pronoun	encodes	the	human/non-human	distinction	
as	well	as	assigning	gender.	In	English,	gender	is	reserved	for	animates	and	the	
pronoun	serves	as	an	indicator	of	high	animacy,	so	we	coded	this	despite	the	fact	
that	there	is	only	one	unambiguously	female	character	in	the	film.	In	addition,	we	
made	use	of	the	referential	category	of	Nickname.	While	not	explicitly	discussed	
in	the	animacy	literature,	nicknames	in	colloquial	discourse	serve	as	markers	of	
familiarity,	and,	by	extension,	empathy.	Our	taxonomy	of	referential	categories	is	
presented	below:	
	
1. Gendered	pronoun	(s/he)	 	
2. Inanimate	pronoun	(it)	 	
3. Name		
4. Nickname		
5. Definite	NP	 	
6. Indefinite	NP	 	
7. Collective	noun	
	
We	then	coded	each	character	for	non-linguistic	features	available	to	the	viewer	
as	cues	to	relative	animacy	as	set	out	in	Figure	1	(Yamamoto	1999)	and	
discussed	in	the	previous	section	on	non-linguistic	cues	to	animacy.	These	
features	are	as	follows:	
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a. Physical	type	(humanoid,	animal,	alien,	machine,	mutant,	inanimate)	
b. Potential	for	movement	(independently	motile,	non-motile)	
c. Eyes	(present,	absent)	
d. Individuation	(individuated,	collective)	
e. Ability	to	speak	(speaking,	non-speaking)	
	
Mr.	Potato	Head,	a	potato-shaped	toy	with	otherwise	fully	human	facial	features,	
arms	and	legs,	was	coded	as	having	humanoid	physical	type.	Our	analysis	was	
inductive	-	as	we	coded	the	characters	for	both	their	animacy	cues	and	
referential	expression,	four	main	categories	emerged,	informed	by	Yamamoto’s	
taxonomy.	These	are:	(1)	anthropomorphic	(toys	whose	form	is	human	or	
human-like),	(2)	animal,	(3)	inanimate	and	(4)	supernatural	beings,	described	
below.	A	further	collective	group,	the	mutant	toys,	are	discussed	separately.	
Counts	of	referential	expressions	are	uninformative,	as	these	depend	as	much	on	
a	character’s	relative	importance	in	the	storyline	as	on	animacy.	Therefore,	we	
did	not	count	tokens	of	referential	expressions,	but	only	types.	
	
Anthropomorphic	Toys	
	
Toy	Story	is	essentially	a	‘buddy	movie’	that	focuses	on	the	relationship	between	
two	central	characters:	Woody,	a	traditional	cloth-and-wood	cowboy	sheriff	doll,	
and	Buzz	Lightyear,	a	plastic	spaceman	with	various	high-tech	features.		Woody	
and	Buzz	are	both	entirely	anthropomorphic,	and	spend	the	film	engaging	in	
comic	banter	with	each	other	and	with	others,	including	another	fully	
anthropomorphized	character,	Bo-Peep,	a	shepherdess	doll.	Other	
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anthropomorphic	characters	are	Mr.	Potato	Head,	whose	character	resembles	an	
elderly	Jewish	man	in	behavior,	voice	and	appearance,	and	Sargeant,	who	is	the	
head	of	a	platoon	of	plastic	toy	soldiers.		
As	a	group,	these	core	characters	are	referred	to	with	the	full	range	of	
high-animacy	expressions:	they	are	named	and	nicknamed,	referred	to	by	
definite	and	indefinite	noun	phrases,	and	gendered	by	pronoun	(although	
interestingly,	Bo-Peep,	arguably	the	only	female	toy	character	in	the	film,	is	
referred	to	only	as	“Bo”).	Buzz	and	Woody	(and	to	a	lesser	extent	Mr.	Potato	
Head)	are	also	referenced	using	a	range	of	descriptive	definite	and	indefinite	
NPs,	including	a	variety	of	affectionate	and	occasionally	insulting	human	
nicknames	which	suggest	familiarity	and	empathy	between	the	characters.	
Woody	has	the	most	of	these,	reflecting	his	complex	role	as	de	facto	leader	of	the	
toys	and	major	protagonist	of	the	film:	“Sheriff”,	“Local	Law	Enforcement”,	“a	sad,	
strange	little	man”,	and	when	accused	of	a	crime,	“you	back-stabbin’	murderer”.		
Buzz,	who	spends	the	film	grappling	with	his	own	status	(see	below),	is	
also	referred	to	with	a	variety	of	titles	and	nicknames:	"Buzz	Lightyear,	Space	
Ranger,	Universe	Protection	Unit"	(referring	to	himself),	“Mr.	Lightyear”,	
“Lightsnack”,	“Buddy”,	“you	idiot”,	“an	action	figure”,	“a	child's	plaything”,	and	
while	suffering	from	delusion,	“Mrs.	Nesbitt”.	Mr.	Potato	Head	is	also	gendered	
by	pronoun	(“he”),	as	well	as	“Potato	Head”	and	“Old	Spudhead”,	and	Sargeant	is	
referred	to	by	his	title	and	“Sarge.”	All	of	these	characters	except	Sarge	also	
possess	all	of	the	non-linguistic	cues	to	high,	anthropomorphic	animacy:	they	are	
individual	and	human(oid)	in	form,	with	visible	eyes;	they	are	fully	motile	using	
biological	movement,	and	they	are	fully	verbal,	speaking	characters.	
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Apart	from	Sargeant,	the	other	toy	soldiers	in	the	platoon,	while	
humanoid,	have	fewer	high-animacy	features,	and	this	is	reflected	in	the	
expressions	used	to	refer	to	them.	The	soliders	are	small,	normally	viewed	from	
a	distance,	and	monochrome	military	green,	which	obscures	their	facial	features,	
including	their	eyes.	They	are	fully	motile,	but	the	fixed	base	under	their	feet	
reminds	the	viewer	of	their	mass-produced,	plastic	material.	Although	they	
occasionally	speak,	they	look	and	behave	like	a	non-individuated	collective,	
carrying	out	operations	as	a	platoon	team.	When	referred	to	in	the	dialogue,	they	
are	named,	but	not	individually;	an	unfamiliar	soldier	is	introduced	as	an	
indefinite	NP	referent	-	“a	Combat	Carl”	-	later	shortened	to	a	personal	name,	
“Carl”.	The	soldiers		are	not	nicknamed	or	gendered	by	third	person	singular	
pronouns,	they	are	"men"	and	referred	to	collectively:	“these	guys	are	
professionals".		
	
Animal	Toys	
	
Another	highly	anthropomorphic	set	of	characters	are	the	animal	toys,	Slinky	the	
Dog,	Rex	the	Dinosaur,	and	Hamm	the	Pig.	Although	they	are	central	characters	
who	participate	in	much	of	the	film’s	dialogue,	the	animal	toys	as	a	group	receive	
a	narrower	range	of	third	person	reference	than	Woody	and	Buzz.	However,	they	
are	consistently	named,	and	Rex	and	Hamm	are	gendered	by	pronoun.	All	three	
of	these	characters	also	receive	nicknames	and	friendly	insults:	“Slink”,	“ya	big	
lizard”,	and	“uncultured	swine.”	These	three	are	not	humanoid	in	form,	but	they	
display	other	key	non-linguistic	cues	for	higher	animacy,	including	individuation,	
eyes,	biological	motion,	and	speech.		
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Just	as	the	toy	soldiers	represent	a	lower-animacy	collective	version	of	
the	human-like	characters,	the	animal	toys	also	have	a	corresponding	collective,	
the	Barrel	o’	Monkeys,	who	are	brought	in	to	rescue	Buzz	when	he	falls	out	of	a	
window.	Similar	to	the	toy	soldiers,	the	monkeys	comprise	a	set	of	non-
individuated	monochrome	plastic	shapes	with	arms	forming	hooks,	effectively	
used	by	the	other	toys	as	tools.	The	monkeys	are	inert	lumps	of	plastic,	non-
motile	and	non-speaking,	and	their	eyes	are	not	apparent.	Congruent	with	these	
visible	cues	to	their	low	animacy,	the	animate	toys	refer	to	them	collectively	only	
as	“the	monkeys”,	and	to	the	chain	they	form	as	“it”.		
	
Inanimates	
	
One	of	the	main	reasons	that	the	first	Toy	Story	film	is	such	engaging	material	for	
a	study	of	animacy	and	anthropomorphism	is	the	relatively	large	number	of	
characters	which	take	the	form	of	mechanical	or	inert	toy	objects,	yet	which	
display	a	range	of	high-animacy	physical	and	behavioral	features.	In	turn,	the	
higher-animacy	toy	characters	employ	referring	expressions	to	assign	them	
varying	levels	of	animacy	and	sentience,	but	the	inanimates	mostly	receive	only	
names	and	some	nicknames.	
Etch	A	Sketch	is	a	motile	(walking)	plastic	drawing	toy	that	has	no	face	
(and	hence,	no	eyes)	and	does	not	speak,	but	silently	communicates	by	drawing	
pictures	on	its	screen	face,	in	the	same	way	children	use	the	real	toy	to	draw.	
Etch	A	Sketch	is	clearly	sentient,	agentive	and	even	humorous;	in	one	scene,	
Woody	approaches	Etch	A	Sketch,	pulls	out	his	gun	and	says,	“Draw!”	–	
whereupon	a	picture	of	a	gun	appears	on	the	screen.	Etch	A	Sketch	is	only	
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referred	to	once	in	third	person,	but	with	a	nickname	(“Etch”),	suggesting	a	high	
level	of	familiarity	with	the	other	toys.	Similarly,	the	Speak	&	Spell,	a	walking	
spelling	toy	with	a	screen	but	no	eyes	or	face,	communicates	through	often	comic	
messages	spelled	across	a	banner.	Woody	adresses	him	politely	as	Mr.	Spell.		
RC,	a	remote	control	car,	has	expressive	eyes	and	a	face.	He	is	non-
speaking	but	can	make	a	whirring	sound	with	his	motor;	he	is	motile,	but	moves	
in	a	wheeled,	mechanical	way.	Although	mechanical,	RC	has	the	status	of	an	
intelligent	pet.	He	is	gendered	by	pronoun,	and	is	the	subject	of	a	clever	allusion	
to	the	film/tv	genre	of	intelligent	animals	who	help	humans	like	Lassie	(the	dog)	
and	Flipper	(the	dolphin),	when	the	following	dialogue	takes	place:		
	
(4)	 RC	Car:		 	 Whirr!!	Whirrrr-whirrrrr!!	
Rex:		 	 	 Hey	everyone!	RC’s	trying	to	say	something!	
	 	 	 What	is	it,	boy?	
RC	Car:		 	 Whirr!!!	Whirrrr!	Whirrrrrr!!	
Mr.	Potato	Head:		 He’s	sayin’	that	this	was	no	accident.		(43-44)	
	
Other	mechanical	toys	appear,	with	varying	mixtures	of	animacy	cues.	Lenny,	a	
walking	pair	of	binoculars	with	huge	‘eyes’,	has	a	minor	speaking	part	and	is	
referred	to	by	name,	but	is	mainly	used	as	a	tool	by	the	other	toys.		Mike,	a	toy	
tape	recorder,	also	walks	and	has	eyes	but	does	not	speak.	However,	he	is	clearly	
sentient	and	benevolent.	He	is	also	referred	to	by	name	and	is	mainly	used	as	a	
tool.	A	walking	hocky	puck	is	addressed	by	name,	with	its	facelessness	the	butt	of	
a	joke	by	another	toy	(“What	you	lookin’	at,	ya	hocky	puck?”);	it	has	no	other	role	
in	the	narrative,	but	the	fact	of	being	motile	and	named	is	enough	to	suggest	that	
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the	other	toys	view	it	as	a	conspecific	and	familiar	member	of	their	community.		
Still	other	toys,	like	the	simple	wooden	Tinkertoys,	are	completely	inanimate,	
showing	no	features	of	sentience	whatsoever.		
Eight	Ball	is	a	solid,	non-motile,	non-speaking	fortune-telling	ball	with	no	
visible	facial	features,	displaying	floating	messages	on	one	side.	The	only	clear	
animate	property	possessed	by	Eight	Ball	is	sentience,	as	its	messages	appear	to	
reflect	a	basic	intelligence.	At	one	point,	Woody	throws	the	ball	down	and	it	falls	
behind	a	desk;	he	tries	to	use	it	as	bait	to	lure	Buzz	into	a	trap:	
	
(5)	 Woody	(pointing	to	the	back	of	the	desk):		
Down	there.	Just	down	there.	A	helpless	
toy…it’s…it’s	trapped,	Buzz!	
Buzz:		 	 	 I	don’t	see	anything!	
Woody:		 	 Oh,	he’s	there.	Just,	just	keep	looking.		(42)	
	
The	ball’s	intermediate	status	with	respect	to	animacy	is	indicated	in	Woody’s	
use	of	pronouns.	In	the	context	of	the	rest	of	the	narrative,	the	initial	use	of	the	
inanimate	pronoun	it	suggests	that	Woody	does	not	empathize	with	it	as	a	
conspecific.	This	further	suggests	that	in	his	following	turn	he	is	cynically	
manipulating	the	implied	animacy	of	the	toy	by	using	the	animate	pronoun	he,	
eliciting	empathy	and	using	the	toy	to	dispense	with	his	rival.		
	
Supernatural	Beings	
	
20	
	
Many	of	the	friendly,	empathetic	interactions	between	toys	described	above	take	
place	towards	the	start	of	the	film,	in	the	closed	environment	of	the	bedroom	
where	the	toys	are	familiar	with	each	other.	Later	in	the	story,	Buzz	and	Woody	
encounter	strange	and	unfamiliar	toys	in	the	wider	world,	and	with	them	the	
viewer	has	to	navigate	the	new	landscape	using	both	linguistic	and	non-linguistic	
cues	to	gauge	the	intentions	of	the	strange	toys.		
The	first	such	encounter	takes	place	when	Buzz	and	Woody	find	
themselves	at	an	amusement	arcade,	inside	a	crane	game,	in	a	glass	tank	full	of	
squeezy	rubber	alien	toys.	The	aliens	are	more	or	less	anthropomorphic,	with	
expressive	faces	and	speaking	voices,	but	they	are	in	a	pile,	identical	and	
unindividuated.	It	soon	becomes	apparent	that	the	aliens	worship	the	huge	metal	
claw	that	dangles	above	them:	“The	claw	is	our	master.	The	claw	chooses	who	
will	go	and	who	will	stay…Shhh.	The	claw.	It	moves.”	When	one	alien	is	captured	
by	the	claw	and	dragged	upwards,	face	down,	it	calls	to	the	others	in	a	nod	to	the	
dystopian	genre	of	Brave	New	World,	“I	have	been	chosen!	Farewell,	my	friends,	I	
go	on	to	a	better	place!	Nirvana	is	coming,	the	mystic	portal	awaits!”	
Based	on	the	aliens’	apparently	sophisticated	belief	system	and	the	
referring	expressions	used	by	the	protagonist	toys	(“you	zealots!”),	the	viewer	is	
invited	to	see	the	aliens	as	high	animacy,	intelligent	beings	forming	an	
unindividuated	collective	–	effectively	a	religious	cult.	From	the	aliens’	point	of	
view,	the	claw	is	a	supernatural	being.	Its	form	is	of	a	metal	object,	with	no	face,	
eyes	or	speaking	ability;	its	motion	is	smoothly	mechanical	rather	than	
biological,	and	the	force	guiding	it	is	unseen.	Yet	it	has	the	apparent	power	of	life	
and	death	over	the	aliens.	The	aliens	refer	to	it	using	the	inanimate	pronoun	(it),	
but	with	first	person	plural	possessive	reference	to	it	as	an	object	of	reverence	
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and	worship	(“The	claw	is	our	master”).	The	Claw	does	not	receive	a	proper	
name	or	nickname,	suggesting	distance	and	respect	rather	than	familiarity	and	
empathy.	The	unique	status	of	The	Claw	as	both	inanimate	and	animate,	sentient,	
potent	yet	unfamiliar,	supports	Yamamoto’s	classification	of	supernatural	beings	
occupying	a	separate	branch	of	animacy	with	a	special,	direct	relationship	to	the	
human	centre,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.		
	
	
Animacy	and	the	Unfolding	Narrative		
	
Further	cross-linguistic	and	discourse-level	studies	(Comrie	1981,	Cherry	1992,	
Chen	2012)	propose	a	finer-grained	set	of	hierarchies	that	condition	the	
grammatical	encoding	of	animacy	and	its	use	in	language	and	discourse.	In	this	
view,	HUMAN,	ANIMAL	and	INANIMATE	are	not	homogeneous	categories,	but	
rather	contain	internal	subhierarchies,	as	shown	in	(6-8):	
	
(6)	 Humans:	 	
a.		 ADULT			>		NON-ADULT	
b.		 FREE		>		ENSLAVED	
c.		 ABLE-BODIED		>		DISABLED	
d.		 LINGUISTICALLY	INTACT		>		PRELINGUISTIC	/	LINGUISTICALLY	IMPAIRED	
e.		 FAMILIAR	(KIN/NAMED)		>		UNFAMILIAR	(UNNAMED)		
(7)	 	Animals:	 	
a.		 HIGHER/LARGE	ANIMAL		>		SMALLER	ANIMAL		>		INSECTS			
b.		 WHOLE	ANIMAL		>		BODY	PARTS	
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(8)	 Inanimates:		 	
a.	 MOTILE/ACTIVE		>		NONMOTILE/INACTIVE	
b.	 NATURAL		>		MAN-MADE	
c.	 COUNT		>		MASS	
	
	
These	finer-grained	animacy	contrasts	are	reflected	in	grammatical	systems;	for	
example,	the	genitive-like	accusative	case	in	Russian	originally	emerged	to	mark	
adult,	freeborn,	healthy	men,	and	could	not	mark	NPs	that	referred	to	women,	
children,	slaves	or	disabled	people	(Comrie	1989:	196).	These	subhierarchies	
may	in	turn	interact	with	each	other.	For	example,	it	has	long	been	observed	that	
when	humans	seek	to	denegrate	or	‘other’	another	person,	a	common	tactic	is	to	
use	metaphorical	linguistic	reference	to	demote	them	to	a	lower	point	on	the	
animacy	hierarchy	(Chen	2012,	Cibulskienė,	this	volume,	Lakoff	&	Johnson	1980)	
invoking	images	of	bestiality	(e.g.	bitch,	pig);	lack	of	individuation	(through	the	
use	of	generic	pronouns	or	collective	group	labels	rather	than	proper	names);	or	
both	(e.g.	swarms	of	refugees).	Several	plotlines	in	Toy	Story	explore	these	
themes	of	relative	humanity	and	animacy	in	detail.	The	crosslinguistic	
subhierarchies	posited	by	Comrie	(1981)	and	Cherry	(1992),	summarised	in	(6-
8),	inform	our	analysis	in	the	following	sections.		
	
The	Mutants	
	
After	encountering	the	toy	aliens	and	the	supernatural	Claw,	Buzz	and	Woody	go	
on	to	meet	unfamiliar	toys	which	test	the	boundaries	of	conspecificity.	In	a	key	
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scene,	Buzz	and	Woody	find	themselves	trapped	in	the	bedroom	of	the	boy	next	
door,	Sid.	Sid	is	a	mean	adolescent	who	enjoys	dismembering	toys	and	
‘transplanting’	their	body	parts.	Sid’s	room	is	dark	and	frightening,	and	the	
direction	of	the	visual	scene	draws	heavily	from	the	classic	horror	genre;	Buzz	
and	Woody	huddle	together	in	the	darkness	while	strange	shadows	dart	around	
the	room.	Woody	shines	a	light	under	Sid’s	bed	and	sees	a	doll’s	head.	Relaxing	a	
bit,	he	addresses	the	unfamiliar	toy:	“Hey!	Hi	there,	little		fellah!	Come	out	here.	
Do	you	know	a	way	out	of	here?”	The	toy	emerges,	and	the	viewer	shares	
Woody’s	horror:	it	is	an	old	doll’s	head,	one-eyed	and	hairless,	attached	to	a	
crawling,	spider-like	mechanical	Erector	set	body.	Other	grotesque	‘mutants’	
appear:	a	pair	of	Barbie	legs	with	a	toy	fishing	pole	for	a	head	and	torso;	a	jack-
in-the-box	with	a	rubber	hand	for	a	head;	and	a	toy	soldier’s	head	screwed	to	a	
skateboard.	None	of	the	mutants	speak,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	they	are	
benevolent	or	malevolent.	The	developing	relationship	between	the	
anthropomorphic	protagonists	and	the	mutants	can	be	divided	into	three	stages,	
in	which	linguistic	cues	mediate	non-linguistic	features	to	inform	us	about	the	
relative	animacy	of	the	unfamiliar	toys:	(a)	unfamiliarity	and	fear,	(b)	potential	
for	cooperation,	(c)	familiarity	and	empathy	(see	Fig.	2).	
In	the	first	scenes	featuring	the	mutants,	their	physical	appearance	is	
alien	and	disturbing,	partly	due	to	their	mixed	human-animal-mechanical	
characteristics.	Several	of	them	lack	faces	or	eyes;	they	incorporate	detached	
body	parts;	they	are	nonspeaking;	they	are	man-made	(mixed	materials,	mainly	
plastic	and	metallic);	they	are	motile,	but	at	first	they	move	as	a	herd	or	swarm	
and	mainly	employ	mechanical	motion.	The	largest	and	most	visually	salient	
mutant,	the	baby	doll	with	the	mechanical	body,	has	a	single	eye	that	is	wide,	
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staring	and	unfocused,	and	its	body	evokes	the	movement	of	a	spider.	These	
visual	and	behavioural	cues	resonate	with	the	lower	ends	of	the	subhierarchies	
in	(6-8),	suggesting	low	animacy,	low	sentience	and,	by	extension,	possibly	
malevolent	intent.	The	referring	expressions	used	by	Buzz	and	Woody	reinforce	
this	view	of	the	mutants	as	a	hostile	collective:	“they’re	cannibals!”,	“you	
savages”,	“you	disgusting	freaks”,	“you	monsters”.	(The	film	here	is	clearly	
drawing	on	horror	and	sci-fi	genres,	as	well	as	narratives	of	‘first	contact’	
between	European	explorers	and	unfamiliar	tribal	peoples).		
Later	in	the	film,	Buzz	loses	an	arm	(see	‘Buzz	is	a	Toy’,	below)	and	the	
mutants	repair	it,	demonstrating	their	benevolence	and	capacity	for	empathy.	
Woody	responds	with	politeness:	“Uh…sorry,	I	…I	thought	that	you	were	
gonna…you	know,	eat	my	friend.”	Apparently	capable	of	receptive	language,	they	
watch	Woody	and	Buzz	talk	to	each	other.	Later,	Woody	asks	them	for	help	to	
save	Buzz:	“Guys!	…	Wait!	Listen!	Please!	I	need	your	help...	Please.”	The	mutants	
gather	around	Woody,	implicitly	agreeing	to	his	request.	Their	silence	now	
seems	nonthreatening	and	we	empathize	with	them,	as	they	have	begun	to	
empathize	with	the	protagonists.	“Thank	you”,	Woody	says.	The	use	of	politeness	
markers	and	the	friendly,	familiar	term	“guys”	align	with	the	behavioral	cues	of	
the	mutants,	signalling		a	re-evaluation	of	their	status	from	malevolent	to	
benevolent,	from	low	sentience	to	intelligent,	and	from	alien	to	conspecific.	
These	are	toys	that	can	probably	be	trusted.	
In	the	final	scenes	with	the	mutants,	the	viewer	sees	Woody	working	with	
them	as	a	team	to	implement	a	complex	rescue	operation,	echoing	an	earlier	
scene	with	the	toy	soliders	at	home	in	Andy’s	bedroom.	The	referring	
expressions	used	in	the	dialogue	now	guide	the	viewer	to	conclude	that	in	the	
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intervening	unseen	hours,	Woody	has	befriended	the	strange	toys.		The	mutants	
are	now	named:	“All	right.	Listen	up.	I	need	Pump	Boy	here	–	Ducky	here.	Legs?	
You’re	with	Ducky.	Rollerbob	and	I	don’t	move	till	we	get	the	signal.	Clear?	…	
Okay,	let’s	move!”	When	the	operation	is	a	success,	Woody	congratulates	the	
mutants:	“Nice	work	fellahs.	Good	job.	Comin’	out	of	the	ground	–	what	a	touch!	
That	was	a	stroke	of	genius.”	Finally,	they	part	ways:	“We	gotta	run!	Thanks,		
guys.”	At	this	third	and	final	stage,	none	of	the	physical	properties	of	the	mutants	
have	changed	–	they	are	still	nonspeaking,	Frankenstein’s	monster	toy	
composites	–	but	Woody’s	linguistic	reference	to	them	invites	the	viewer	to	fully	
empathise	with	them.	They	are	now	individuated,	familiar	and	named,	and	
Woody’s	use	of	“genius”	highlights	their	newly	evidenced	cleverness	and	his	new	
respect.	Figure	2	depicts	this	progression.		
	
Figure	2:	Increasing	empathy	with	the	mutant	toys	
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Buzz	is	a	Toy	
	
Just	as	the	mutant	toys	move	through	an	arc	from	unfamiliar	to	familiar,	the	Buzz	
Lightyear	character	undergoes	a	parallel	character	development	as	he	comes	to	
realize	his	true	nature	as	a	toy.	In	this	storyline,	the	film	explores	philosophical	
ideas	around	mortality,	hubris,	and	the	earth-bound	state	of	humanity	through	
the	journey	of	self-discovery	of	an	anthropomorphic	toy.		
The	Buzz	Lightyear	character	arrives	near	the	start	of	the	film	and	
immediately	disrupts	the	equilibrium	of	the	community	of	toys	in	Andy’s	
bedroom.	He	is	an	extravagantly	designed	and	packaged,	high-tech	toy	with	a	red	
light	‘laser’,	space	helmet,	pop-up	wings,	and	an	arm	with	‘karate-chop	action’.	
Unlike	Woody	and	the	other	toy	characters,	Buzz	is	unaware	of	his	own	status	as	
a	toy,	and	genuinely	believes	that	he	is	a	spaceman	on	a	mission	to	save	the	
galaxy.	Woody,	a	fraying	cloth	cowboy	doll,	is	simultaneously	envious	of	Buzz	
and	exasperated	by	what	he	sees	as	Buzz’s	delusional	state:	
	
(9)	 Woody:		 Look,	we’re	all	really	impressed	with	Andy’s	new	toy…	
Buzz:		 			 Toy?	
Woody:		 T-O-Y.	Toy.	
Buzz:		 			 Excuse	me,	I	think	the	word	you’re	looking	for	is	Space		 	
Ranger.	
Woody:		 The	word	I’m	searching	for	I	can’t	say	because	there’s	pre-
school	toys	present.		(28)	
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In	the	alternative	world	of	the	film,	toys	occupy	an	intermediate	position	in	the	
animacy	schema.	While	most	are	fully	anthropomorphic,	sentient	and	otherwise	
share	identical	properties	with	humans,	their	relationship	to	actual	humans	in	
the	film	is	complex.	When	humans	are	present,	the	toys	de-animate,		which	
necessarily	assigns	them	a	lower	position	on	the	animacy	scale.	The	‘company’	
metaphor	adopted	in	the	film	sees	the	toys	as	staff	working	for	human	employers	
within	a	hierarchy.	At	the	same	time,	the	toys	are	clearly	a	distinct	species	from	
the	real	pet	animals	which	also	populate	the	film.		
Returning	to	the	radial	diagram	shown	in	Figure	1,	the	system	of	animacy	
within	the	alternative	world	of	the	toys	can	be	seen	as	a	shifted	version	of	this	
anthropocentric	worldview,	with	toys	occupying	the	central	node	(equivalent	to	
humans).	In	this	world,	then,	humans	may	be	seen	as	equivalent	to	Supernatural	
Beings,	occupying	a	separate,	higher	node	–	revered	but	little	understood.	Buzz’s	
conviction	that	he	is	an	actual	human	(with	supernatural	properties,	including	
flight)	makes	him	guilty	of	hubris	in	the	eyes	of	the	other	toys.		
Throughout	the	first	half	of	the	film,	Buzz	continues	to	deny	his	toyhood.	
He	convinces	himself	that	he	can	fly	when	he	bounces	off	a	rubber	ball	and	is	
accidently	propelled	into	the	air,	landing	safely	at	the	other	side	of	the	room.	In	
the	end,	he	is	faced	with	irrefutable	evidence:	he	sees	a	television	commercial	for	
Buzz	Lightyear	toys.	His	eyes	widen	as	the	announcer	intones	“Not	a	flying	toy”,	
cutting	to	a	shot	of	rows	of	boxes	of	identical	toy	Buzz	Lightyears	stacked	on	
shelves.	He	looks	down	as	his	wrist	and	reads	“MADE	IN	TAIWAN”.	Stunned	and	
dejected,	Buzz	sees	an	open	window	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.	He	pops	his	wings	
open	and	leaps	up	towards	the	window.	In	slow	motion,	he	starts	to	fall,	landing	
at	the	bottom	of	the	stairs	next	to	his	arm,	which	has	broken	off	on	impact.		
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This	scene	draws	together	many	threads	related	to	animacy	which	lead	to	
a	moment	of	self-awareness	for	Buzz,	of	his	own	toyhood	and	by	extension,	his	
mortality.	First,	in	the	ad	Buzz	hears	himself	referred	to	with	an	indefinite	noun,	
“a	toy”.	The	images	of	rows	of	identical	dolls	further	de-individuate	him;	he	is	no	
longer	a	unique	individual,	but	a	member	of	a	huge	set	of	identical	action	figures.	
The	“MADE	IN	TAIWAN”	label	is	evidence	that	he	is	mass-produced	plastic,	not	
flesh.	Finally,	his	fall	reduces	him	to	component	body	parts,	and	echoes	the	myth	
of	Icarus,	also	punished	for	his	hubris.	Buzz’s	realisation	resonates	with	
theological	and	philosophical	questions	around	the	human	condition,	and	the	
viewer	naturally	empathizes	with	this	trope	of	a	deluded	‘hero’	who	is	brought	
roughly	back	to	earth.	Only	when	Buzz	reaches	this	state	of	self-awareness	does	
he	become	–	morally	–	fully	‘human’.		
With	this	realization,	Buzz	faces	an	identity	crisis,	and	refers	to	himself	
with	an	indefinite	NP:	“No,	Woody,	for	the	first	time	I	am	thinking	clearly.	You	
were	right	all	along.	I’m	not	a	space	ranger.	I’m	just	a	toy.	A	stupid	little	
insignificant	toy.”	In	terms	of	animacy,	Buzz	is	a	complex	figure.	He	is	a	
manufactured	toy,	neither	supernatural	nor	truly	‘free’,	but	he	is	capable	of	
emotion,	altruism,	cleverness	and	self-consciousness,	all	hallmarks	of	being	
human.	Eventually	he	comes	to	terms	with	his	status,	and	discovers	that	even	as	
a	toy	he	is	still	capable	of	great	heroism.	Ironically,	accepting	that	he	is	a	toy	
makes	him	human	(Figure	3).		
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Figure	3:	Buzz	achieves	self-awareness	
	
	
Discussion	and	Conclusion	
	
In	this	study,	we	have	explored	how	linguistic	reference	maintains	cues	to	
relative	animacy	and	helps	align	viewers’	empathies	in	a	fictional	world.	
Our	analysis	of	the	Toy	Story	film	suggests	that	non-linguistic	cues	interact	with	
referential	language	to	support	distinctions	of	relative	animacy	along	the	entire	
animacy	hierarchy.	The	relative	animacy	invoked	in	the	film	is	best	
conceptualised	with	the	help	of	a	radial	picture	(Fig.	1,	adapted	from	Yamamoto	
1999),	in	which	anthropomorphic	beings	are	at	the	center,	with	all	other	
categories	viewed	in	relation	to	humans	but	not	in	relation	to	one	another.	The	
use	of	referential	expressions	serves	to	help	communicate	the	film’s	
conceptualisation	of	the	relative	animacy	and	positioning	of	its	toy	characters.		
Our	analysis	shows	the	applicability	of	subhierarchies	of	animacy	
proposed	in	the	literature	(Comrie	1981,	Cherry	1992,	Chen	2012).	In	addition	to	
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forms	of	expression	used	in	standard	accessibility	scales,	we	also	found	the	use	
of	nicknames	to	be	revealing	as	an	indicator	of	familiarity,	conspecificity	and	
empathy.	Although	referential	forms	and	levels	of	animacy	are	not	mapped	
directly	onto	one	another,	there	is	a	clear	relation	between	them,	and	referential	
language	is	used	in	the	film	to	effectively	signal	subtle	animacy	distinctions.	
As	a	work	of	children’s	fiction,	Toy	Story	builds	on	a	modern	construal	of	
children’s	cognitive	development,	including	their	interest	in	relative	and	
potential	animacy.	The	target	audience	of	Toy	Story	is	made	up	of	young	children	
with	malleable	notions	of	animacy,	and	a	still	developing	understanding	of	the	
implicit	relationships	between	referential	expressions,	referents	and	semantic	
properties.	Although	even	infants	show	sensitivity	to	the	animate-inanimate	
distinction,	comprehension	of	the	interacting	cues	to	animacy	has	a	long	
developmental	trajectory	over	the	first	decade	of	life	(Gelman	&	Opfer	2010,	
Rakison	&	Poulin-Dubois	2001),	and	is	subject	to	cross-cultural	variation	(Atran	
et	al.	2001,	Carey	1985).	Similarly,	the	literature	on	pragmatic	development	has	
shown	that,	while	children	are	sensitive	to	some	pragmatic	cues	early	in	
linguistic	development,	many	pragmatic	skills	emerge	slowly.	Children	do	not	
show	adult-like	attainment	in	either	production	or	comprehension	of	referential	
expressions	even	by	the	age	of	eight	or	nine	(Matthews	2014),	but	the	film	
cleverly	makes	use	of	both	visual	and	linguistic	cues	to	animacy	to	convey	the	
shifted	animacy	relations	at	play	in	its	fictive	social	world.	Young	children	under	
the	age	of	ten	can	easily	understand	many	cues	to	animacy	used	in	the	film	(and	
by	toy	manufacturers).	Referential	expressions	are	subtly	employed	to	reinforce	
and	supplement	the	primary	available	cues.		
This	paper	focusses	on	a	narrative	intended	for	a	young	audience,	but	we	
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have	not	examined	children’s	own	use	of	referential	expressions	or	their	
comprehension	of	the	animacy	distinctions	portrayed	in	the	film.	This	would	be	
an	interesting	case	for	further	research,	considering	the	use	of	multiple	cues	to	
relative	animacy,	the	narrative	development	of	characters	along	animacy	scales,	
and	the	sometimes	sophisticated	related	concepts	explored	in	the	film.		
The	power	of	referential	language	to	convey	and	subvert	animacy	roles	is	
encapsulated	in	one	more	scene	from	the	film	(109-110),	in	which	Woody	scares	
the	mean	neighbor	boy,	Sid,	by	breaking	the	law	of	de-animating	in	the	presence	
of	humans:	“That’s	right.	I’m	talking	to	YOU,	Sid	Phillips.	We	don’t	like	being	
blown	up,	Sid,	or	smashed,	or	ripped	apart…”	Sid’s	terrified	response	shows	the	
menace	of	realising	that	the	natural	order	of	animacy	has	been	subverted,	
represented	in	a	single	pronoun:	““W-w-w-we?	[...]	
AAAAAAAGGGGGGHHHHHH!!!!!…	The	Toys!	The	toys	are	alive!"		
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i	This	is	a	recurrent	theme	in	child	literature;	see,	for	instance,	classic	stories	like	The	Velveteen	
Rabbit	(Williams,	1922)	and	The	Little	Engine	that	Could	(Piper,	1930).	
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ii	References	from	the	Toy	Story	screenplay	are	from	Whedon	et	al.	(1995).		Hereafter,	all	quotes	
with	no	source	indicated	are	from	this	version	of	the	screenplay,	and	we	refer	to	page	numbers	
only	for	longer	quotes.	
